Podcast Defamation: When a Minnesota Host Can Be Sued

What does a defamation claim over a podcast episode require in Minnesota?

The person suing must prove four things: the statement was communicated to someone else, it is false, it tends to harm their reputation and lower them in the community’s estimation, and listeners reasonably understand it to refer to a specific individual. The Minnesota Supreme Court set out those elements in McKee v. Laurion, 825 N.W.2d 725 (Minn. 2013), a case about posts on doctor-rating websites. An episode that anyone has heard meets the first element.

Damages follow two tracks. Some statements are defamatory per se, which the court described in Maethner v. Someplace Safe, Inc., 929 N.W.2d 868 (Minn. 2019) as including “false accusations of committing a crime and false statements about a person’s business, trade, or professional conduct.” For those, the common law presumes harm to reputation. Otherwise, the plaintiff must show actual harm to reputation. In Maethner, that showing failed because the plaintiff “could not name anyone who thought ill or less of him because of the statements.” The court reinstated the dismissal of his claim against the nonprofit that published the statements. It sent his claim against his former wife back to the district court “to decide in the first instance whether the challenged statements involve a matter of public or private concern,” which determines whether presumed damages remain available. Emotional distress alone does not carry a Minnesota defamation claim.

For a business podcast, the riskiest content is the second per se category: a host saying a competitor, vendor, former employee, or customer cheated, lied, or broke the law. That kind of claim is also the core of most business defamation claims, and the way courts measure the money is covered in how defamation damages are measured.

Why is a host responsible for what a guest says on the show?

Minnesota follows the republication rule: a host who airs a guest’s false accusation can be liable for it, not just the guest. In Larson v. Gannett Co., 940 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 2020), a case against a television station and a newspaper, the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that “Under the republication doctrine, a speaker may be liable for repeating the defamatory statements of another.” It described the rule as providing that “a speaker who knows or should know that a statement is false and defamatory but repeats it nonetheless is equally as liable for the defamation as the original speaker.”

That rule reaches the interview format directly. When you record a guest, edit the conversation, and publish it under your show’s name, you are repeating what the guest said to your audience. Your exposure turns on the fault standard in the next sections: what you knew, or reasonably should have known, about whether the guest’s accusation was true.

Federal law does not shield words you create yourself. Section 230 provides that “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” and 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) defines that content provider as one who “is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development” of the information. A guest release agreement can allocate responsibility between you and a guest by contract, but it does not bind the person the guest talked about.

When does commentary on a podcast become a statement of fact?

Commentary becomes actionable when it states or implies a fact that can be proven true or false. In McKee, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that “The First Amendment protects statements of pure opinion from defamation claims,” and it treated calling a doctor “a real tool” as rhetorical hyperbole that cannot be proven true or false. Name-calling and other opinion amounting to “mere vituperation and abuse” or “rhetorical hyperbole” fall on that side of the line, and the court said such an opinion “cannot be the basis for a defamation action.”

Three rules from the same case matter to anyone hosting a show:

1. Attribution is itself a fact. The poster wrote that a nurse called the doctor a real tool. The court said “whether a nurse actually made the statement to Laurion is an assertion that can be proven true or false.” It still held that statement not actionable, because pinning a vague insult on an unnamed nurse added no defamatory meaning. A specific accusation credited to an unnamed source or to people in your industry raises a different question, because under the republication doctrine in Larson, “a speaker may be liable for repeating the defamatory statements of another.”
2. Truth defeats the claim. The court repeated that “Truth is a complete defense to a defamation action,” and that “If the statement is true in substance, minor inaccuracies of expression or detail are immaterial.”
3. The test is the gist. A statement is substantially true when it would have the same effect on the listener as the precise truth. Getting a date or a figure slightly wrong is different from getting the accusation wrong.

What fault does the person suing have to prove?

The required fault depends on who is suing. A public official suing over official conduct must prove actual malice, which the U.S. Supreme Court defined in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) as a statement made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” The Minnesota Supreme Court noted in Maethner that “public figures and public officials must meet a higher standard when challenging defamatory statements, requiring proof of actual malice.”

A private person needs less. In Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 1985), a suit against a newspaper, the court held “that a private individual may recover actual damages for a defamatory publication upon proof that the defendant knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that the defamatory statement was false.” The defendant’s conduct is judged against a reasonable person in similar circumstances, and the customs of the profession are relevant without being controlling. Maethner applied the same standard to a nonprofit that was not a news outlet.

Presumed damages bring the actual malice standard back for speech on public issues. As the court restated it in Johnson v. Freborg, 995 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 2023), “a private plaintiff may not recover presumed damages for defamatory statements involving a matter of public concern unless the plaintiff can establish actual malice.” In Freborg, a public Facebook post accusing a private dance instructor of sexual assault qualified, and the form of the speech weighed in that direction because the poster “disseminated her speech on her Facebook account, making her post publicly available to anyone.” Three justices dissented, and the case went back for trial on truth and actual malice. A publicly released episode shares that public availability, but content and context still weigh in the balance.

How does the fair report privilege protect true-crime and news episodes?

A fair and accurate report of an official public proceeding is privileged even when the accusation being reported turns out to be false. In Moreno v. Crookston Times Printing Co., 610 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 2000), the Minnesota Supreme Court applied the privilege to a newspaper’s report of a citizen’s accusation at a city council meeting and held that it “will not be defeated by a showing of common law malice, but is defeated by a showing that the report is not a fair and accurate report of that proceeding.”

Larson extended the privilege to an official law enforcement press conference and press release about a police officer’s killing. The court held that “the fair and accurate reporting privilege protects news reports that accurately and fairly summarize statements about a matter of public concern made by law enforcement officers during an official press conference and in an official news release.” The man the police had named was later cleared, and the privilege still applied to the reports of what the officials said. The court distinguished “informal interviews or private conversations with arresting officers or investigators, which are neither official actions or proceedings nor open to the public.”

The privilege covers the report, not the host’s additions. Moreno held that it “can be defeated if additional contextual material, not part of the proceeding, is added that conveys a defamatory impression or comments on the veracity or integrity of any party.” In Larson, five of the statements went back for a new trial on whether the reports were fair and accurate. If an episode relies on a hearing, a council meeting, or an official police statement, I suggest quoting or closely summarizing what was said and keeping your own theories plainly separate, because commentary layered onto the official account is what the court said can defeat the privilege.

How does Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law work when a podcaster is sued?

Minnesota’s Uniform Public Expression Protection Act lets a defendant sued over speech on a matter of public concern ask the court to dismiss the claim early, with discovery paused and attorney fees at stake. Under Minn. Stat. § 554.08(b)(3), the act covers a claim based on the defendant’s “exercise of the right of freedom of speech or of the press . . . on a matter of public concern.” The motion’s timing is set by § 554.09: “Not later than 60 days after a party is served with a complaint, crossclaim, counterclaim, third-party claim, or other pleading that asserts a cause of action to which sections 554.07 to 554.19 apply, or at a later time on a showing of good cause, the party may file a special motion for expedited relief to dismiss the cause of action or part of the cause of action.” Check the current text of that section the day a complaint is served.

What happens after filing:

1. Discovery stops. Under § 554.10(a)(1), “all other proceedings between the moving party and responding party, including discovery and a pending hearing or motion, are stayed.” Under § 554.10(d), “the court may allow limited discovery if a party shows that specific information is necessary to establish whether a party has satisfied or failed to satisfy a burden under section 554.13, paragraph (a), and the information is not reasonably available unless discovery is allowed.”
2. The court decides on evidence. Section 554.12 lets the court consider “any evidence that could be considered in ruling on a motion for summary judgment under Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 56.03.” Under § 554.13(a), the court “shall dismiss with prejudice a cause of action, or part of a cause of action, if” three conditions are all met. First, the moving party establishes under § 554.08(b) that the act applies. Second, the responding party fails to establish under § 554.08(c) that the act does not apply. Third, either “the responding party fails to establish a prima facie case as to each essential element of the cause of action” or the moving party establishes one of two things. Those two things are that the responding party failed to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted, or that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. A denial can be appealed as a matter of right. Section 554.15 provides that “A moving party may appeal as a matter of right from an order denying, in whole or in part, a motion under section 554.09.” It adds: “The appeal must be filed not later than 30 days after entry of the order.” Check the current text of that section the day an order is entered.
4. Fees follow the result. Under § 554.16, “the court shall award court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and reasonable litigation expenses related to the motion” to a moving party that prevails. The plaintiff recovers fees only if the court finds the motion “was frivolous or filed solely with intent to delay the proceeding.”

Coverage is the first fight. In J&D Dental v. Hou, 26 N.W.3d 491 (Minn. Ct. App. 2025), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that public concern is decided “on a case-by-case basis given the totality of circumstances, taking into consideration the content, form, and context of the speech, as well as any other pertinent factors.” The public online form of a patient’s Google reviews weighed toward coverage, but their content was a personal grievance, so the act did not apply. An episode about an industry practice, a public controversy, or official conduct fits the statute’s words more easily than one airing a private dispute. More on the act’s history and the Minnesota decisions under it is in my article on the Minnesota anti-SLAPP statute.

Where can a podcaster be sued over an episode heard nationwide?

A court in the plaintiff’s home state needs more than the fact that the plaintiff lives there and could hear the episode there. In Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002), an Alabama plaintiff won a default judgment in Alabama against a Minnesota resident over internet newsgroup posts, and the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to enforce it. Applying federal due process, the court held that “something more than mere effects in the forum state is required.”

The plaintiff had to show that the defendant expressly aimed her statements at Alabama, so that Alabama was the focal point of the conduct. The posts were about Egyptology and went to readers everywhere, and the court said that messages that “could have been read in Alabama, just as they could have been read anywhere in the world” did not make Alabama the focal point. The court contrasted a magazine-article case the U.S. Supreme Court decided, in which the article concerned a California entertainer’s California activities and had its largest circulation in California. An episode built around one state’s people and events, promoted to that state’s audience, looks more like that magazine article than like the newsgroup posts in Griffis.

What happens to confidential sources in a podcast defamation case?

Minnesota’s Free Flow of Information Act protects people who gather and publish information from revealing their sources. In a defamation case, a court can order a source disclosed only when the source’s identity bears on actual malice and two further statutory conditions are also met. Minn. Stat. § 595.023 provides that “no person who is or has been directly engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public shall be required by any court” to disclose a source, “or to disclose any unpublished information procured by the person in the course of work or any of the person’s notes, memoranda, recording tapes, film or other reportorial data.” The statute’s words describe the activity, not a particular medium.

The defamation exception is in Minn. Stat. § 595.025, subd. 1: the protection “shall not apply in any defamation action where the person seeking disclosure can demonstrate that the identity of the source will lead to relevant evidence on the issue of actual malice.” Under subd. 2, disclosure also requires “probable cause to believe that the source has information clearly relevant to the issue of defamation” and a showing “that the information cannot be obtained by any alternative means or remedy less destructive of first amendment rights.” Under subd. 3, the court must make findings of fact, and while an appeal is pending, “the order is stayed and nondisclosure shall remain in full force and effect.”

In Weinberger v. Maplewood Review, 668 N.W.2d 667 (Minn. 2003), the Minnesota Supreme Court applied that exception to order a newspaper reporter who was not a party to identify which defendants were the sources of statements in his article. Two justices dissented. If an episode rests on a confidential source, I suggest assuming a court could order the source disclosed and saying only what you could defend if that happened, because the exception is written for exactly the defamation case you would be facing.

What should a podcaster do after receiving a defamation demand letter?

Preserve the record first, then weigh the claim against the rules above before you respond. Truth, fault, and the fair report privilege are all decided on evidence, so I suggest keeping every published version of the episode with its release date, the raw recording, show notes, research files, and messages with the guest, because those materials are how you show what you knew and what you relied on.

Then work through the claim in order:

1. Identify the exact words. The letter should quote the statements it says are false. Compare each one to your sources and decide whether it is a fact, an opinion, or a report of an official proceeding.
2. Note the limitations language. Minn. Stat. § 541.07 provides that “the following actions shall be commenced within two years:” and lists “(1) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort resulting in personal injury”. Under clause (1), a libel or slander claim over an episode must be brought within two years, the same period that applies to assault, battery, false imprisonment, and other torts resulting in personal injury. Check the current text of the statute rather than relying on this summary.
3. Know which clock runs when. The anti-SLAPP motion window in § 554.09 runs from service of a complaint or other pleading, not from the demand letter.
4. Decide on any correction separately. Minnesota’s retraction statute, Minn. Stat. § 548.06, is written for a libel “in a newspaper.” The considerations in retraction or correction still apply to a podcast as a business decision.

How you answer matters too. A reply that repeats the accusation or attacks the sender can add to the record, as explained in how a demand letter can backfire, and the structure of a typical defamation cease and desist letter shows what the sender will be looking for in your response.

Podcast Defamation in Minnesota

A podcast episode is subject to the same defamation elements as any other publication: the host can answer for a guest’s false accusation, an opinion label does not protect an implied false fact, and the plaintiff’s status sets the fault standard. Minnesota’s fair report privilege protects accurate reports of official proceedings, the anti-SLAPP special motion can end a weak claim early with fees, and the source privilege yields only when a source bears on actual malice and the statute’s two other disclosure conditions are met. More on these claims is in my business torts material. If you would like a second set of eyes on an episode, a guest’s statement, or a demand letter you have received, email aaron@aaronhall.com with a brief description and a link to the episode.